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Abstract 
We investigate the endogenous formation of sanctioning institutions supposed to improve 
efficiency in the voluntary provision of public goods. Our paper parallels Markussen et al. 
(forthcoming) in that our experimental subjects vote over formal vs. informal sanctions, 
but it goes beyond that paper by endogenizing the formal sanction scheme. We find that 
self-determined formal sanctions schemes are popular and efficient when they carry no up-
front cost, but as in Markussen et al., informal sanctions are more popular and efficient 
than formal sanctions when adopting the latter entails such a cost. Practice improves the 
performance of sanction schemes: they become more targeted and deterrent with learning. 
Voters’ characteristics, including their tendency to engage in perverse informal 
sanctioning, help to predict individual voting. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Social dilemmas, in which uniformly self-interested behavior makes a social goal less 
rather than more attainable, are recurrent problems in modern economies. The common 
‘textbook’ solution is the use of what we call formal sanctioning schemes. This solution 
relies on the coercive powers of the state, which can make contributions (such as tax 
payments) mandatory and subject to penalties for non-compliance. But formal sanction 
schemes are costly as they require infrastructure (like a judicial system, police and prisons) 
and their use seems infeasible or unnecessary in some situations. There are indeed 
numerous collective action dilemmas, including provision of public goods that fall beneath 
government notice because they are too local or parochial, for which this solution is 
unavailable or less efficient than what we call informal sanctions. Informal sanctions are 
decentralized and horizontal in nature and do not require formal infrastructure as they rely 
on peer punishment. The willingness to mete out such (costly) informal sanctions and to 
do so in a well-targeted way depends on the characteristics of group members, in particular 
their social preferences. 
While the workings of formal sanctions are rather independent of social 
preferences once they are in place, their establishment is likely not to be. The very 
existence of a government that can promulgate and enforce regulations to deter free riding 
while acting as a faithful agent of its citizens depends on voluntary pro-social acts such as 
citizen scrutiny of politicians’ actions, self-education about political issues, and making 
the effort to vote in elections. The relationship between voluntary collective action and 
fulfillment of obligations under threat of formal sanctions is thus a complex one, and the 
question of when we can or should rely on formal sanctions to resolve social dilemmas is 
an important and underexplored issue.   
Experimental economists have extensively studied public goods problems, with a 
special focus on voluntary contribution dilemmas with informal sanctions (for overviews, 
see Gӓchter and Herrmann, 2008 and Chaudhuri, 2011).  More centralized forms of 
governance, and the conditions, if any, under which informal sanctions regimes are 
preferable to formal ones, have received surprisingly little attention until the present paper 
 4 
and a companion paper by Markussen et al. (2010).
1
 The reason for this neglect may be 
that it seems obvious to an economist that appropriately designed formal sanctions 
dominate informal ones. We argue that which sanctions scheme is the better choice is far 
from obvious when agents are not fully rational and self-interested. Our results indeed 
show that apparently dominated informal sanctions are chosen quite often when formal 
sanctions are available at a moderate fixed cost, and that they are surprisingly successful if 
chosen. Our results also show that if voters have a say on how formal sanction schemes are 
to be designed, they design them to target free riders and to be deterrent in strength, which 
contributes to their efficiency. 
In a formal sanctions (FS) regime, a group adopts a rule specifying what penalties 
will be imposed under what conditions and sets up a body (in large group settings, an 
administration or government) that observes rule violations and imposes the stipulated 
penalties. In an informal sanctions (IS) regime, group members can punish each other at a 
cost to both the punisher and the punished. Because such sanctions are costly, a rational 
and selfish decision-maker does not engage in IS in one-shot (and, by extension, finitely 
repeated) interaction, and voting for IS is therefore pointless among such agents. In 
contrast, voting for FS is (at least weakly) dominant for rational and self-interested agents, 
as long as FS target free riders reliably and the fixed cost of having FS in place does not 
exceed its benefit. In such a population, FS are the efficient choice.  
Even when rationality, self-interest, and common knowledge assumptions are 
relaxed, appropriately designed FS may be preferred by voters. One reason is that in an 
ideal system of FS, sanctions are meted out automatically but uncertainty prevails about 
who will impose IS on whom, and when. The predictability of FS may mean that fewer 
costly sanctions need be imposed under a FS regime, an efficiency advantage. If IS do 
occur when allowed, there is no way to guarantee that they are not misdirected (“perverse” 
or “anti-social”) and to rule out attempts at retaliation (see below), whereas rules in the 
interest of every group member can assure that FS are well targeted. This may help explain 
                                                 
1
 Some recent contributions on sanction systems in which a central or specialized agent is the only one 
empowered to sanction are discussed and compared to decentralized or informal sanction schemes by 
Nosenzo and Sefton (2012). In our paper, we consider only those centralized sanction schemes that are rule-
based, as opposed to ones that empower a central agent to use his or her discretion.  We defer discussion of 
“pool punishment” (Sigmund et al., 2010) until the next section. 
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why the centralized administration of penalties has traditionally been seen as the hallmark 
of civilization, whereas the enforcement of rules by individuals is often denigrated as 
“vigilante justice” or “mob rule.” 
There are reasons for preferring informal sanctions in some circumstances, 
however. We think of IS in connection with village management of woodlots and 
irrigation systems or social pressure in work teams, while FS bring to mind managerial 
structures and governments. Having an enforcing body in place—for example, a police 
force and courts—involves enforcement structures that, paradoxically, may need to be 
used relatively little if their presence suffices to deter the social bads they are meant to 
prevent. Informal sanctions may be less deterrent because they are less certain, but they 
may have the advantage of avoiding substantial fixed costs.
2
 
By investigating collective choice between FS and IS, our paper contributes to a 
recent and rather thin experimental literature on endogenous institutions (see section 2 for 
references). Our design involves repeated choice between FS and IS, both when having FS 
in place is costly and when it is not.
 
 As a control, we also conduct sessions in which 
neither FS nor IS are available.  
These design aspects are also present in a companion paper by Markussen, 
Putterman and Tyran (forthcoming). To our knowledge, these two studies constitute the 
first experimental research on collective choice between and performance under both FS 
and IS schemes. The key difference between the two studies is that whereas in Markussen 
et al., the FS scheme available to a given subject group is exogenously specified, subjects 
in the present paper not only choose between FS and IS but also determine the parameters 
of the FS, if used. This additional dimension of choice makes collective choices 
cognitively more demanding for voters. An important implication of this difference is that 
we create a more level playing field between FS and IS by allowing subjects to choose 
inefficient properties of the FS scheme. Voters can choose to implement either deterrent or 
non-deterrent sanctions, paralleling the fact that IS can be strong or weak. Voters also have 
                                                 
2
 To be sure, the idea that formal sanctions are more certain than informal ones does not always hold. A 
government might be inept, corrupt, or lacking in enforcement capacity, whereas if most members of a group 
were to embrace the goal in question, informal sanctioning may be a highly predictable response to norm 
violation.  
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the possibility of implementing “perverse” formal sanctions—ones that punish high 
contributors, similar to the “perverse” sanctions that are frequently observed in 
experiments with IS. Our new design also adds insight into the roles of experience and 
individual orientations in voting decisions.  
Our study and that of Markussen et al. also differ in other details, including the 
country in which they were conducted, the level of fixed costs for having FS in place, 
presence or absence of variable costs of formal sanctions, and inclusion of treatments 
allowing exposure to each institution prior to voting. While strict comparisons are ruled 
out since multiple dimensions differ, each study’s results can be viewed as a set of 
informal robustness tests of the other.  The main shared results are that informal sanctions 
are surprisingly popular and effective, and that fixed costs of having FS in place are crucial 
to subjects’ choices between IS and FS. 
Novel findings of the present study are that subjects improve the terms of their 
formal sanctions schemes with learning, that they prefer deterrent over non-deterrent 
formal sanctions, and that subjects who exhibit cooperative tendencies are significantly 
more likely to vote for efficiency-enhancing institutions, and vice versa for those with 
uncooperative tendencies. The finding that the latter are likely to vote against efficiency-
enhancing institutions, but usually as a minority, affirms a potentially important insight 
about heterogeneous social preferences and majority voting (Ertan et al., 2009).  To 
conserve space, we leave details of Markussen et al.’s findings to be discussed in the 
context of comparisons to our own findings, below. 
We proceed as follows: Section 2 discusses theoretical considerations regarding 
collective action and formal and informal sanctions, and briefly reviews relevant 
experimental research. Section 3 spells out our experimental design, the rationale behind 
the various treatments, and the predictions both under the assumption of common 
knowledge of rationality and self-interest and under alternative behavioral assumptions. 
Section 4 summarizes the experimental results. Section 5 concludes the paper with a brief 
summary and suggestions for future research. 
 
2. Theory and literature 
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We consider a group with n members who engage in a finitely repeated interaction where, 
in each period, each individual must allocate an endowment of E money units between a 
private and a public (or group) account. Money placed in the public account is scaled up 
and divided equally among the group members, generating a marginal private return on 
contributions m, where 0 < m < 1, and a return to the group of m·n, where 1 < m·n < n. In 
this canonical voluntary contribution mechanism or public goods game, total earnings are 
maximized if each member places the full E in the public account, but it is in each 
individual’s private interest to put zero in that account.3  
 
a) Behavior under and voting on sanctions regimes, according to standard theory 
 
Suppose that group members are asked to vote for one of two alternatives: (a) engaging in 
the interaction under the rules described above, and (b) engaging in an otherwise identical 
interaction while additionally implementing a formal sanction scheme where for each 
monetary unit an individual puts in her private account, she is fined s units, with s > 1 – m, 
and implementing the scheme costs each individual f per period. Then as long as f < (m∙n – 
1)∙E and the assumption of common knowledge of self-interest and rationality holds, group 
members earn more per period with than without the scheme. This is because the scheme 
induces a rational individual to contribute E to the public account, and with all doing this, 
each earns m∙n∙E – f per period, which exceeds the E per period earned under option (a). 
An individual would accordingly choose (b) over (a) if expecting to influence the outcome 
with positive probability.
4
  
 
Suppose now that there is a third option, (c), wherein the game played by the group 
of individuals each period has two stages. In the first stage, each individual decides how 
many of his or her E units to allocate to the public account. In the second stage, each 
individual learns the amount allocated by each of the other n – 1 individuals and can 
                                                 
3
 To be sure, models assuming infinite repetition are often applicable, because last periods can be 
unpredictable and reputations may carry into new settings. However, finite repetition can also be argued to 
characterize a variety of real world circumstances, and for an initial exploration, there are advantages to 
confronting the clear predictions of the finite repetition model with empirical observations in a controlled 
setting.  
4
 It is true that there exist many subgame perfect equilibria with non-pivotal voting, under which some 
subjects vote for option (a). However, the possibility of errors and absence of opportunities to communicate 
suggests that they would reject weakly dominated choices and vote for option (b) (trembling-hand perfect 
equilibrium).  
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reduce the earnings of any of them by P units per unit deducted from her own provisional 
earnings for the period. Suppose that an individual i contributes Ci to the public account. 
Then, the individual’s earnings for the period are given by 
 
   ij jiij ijij ji pPpCmCE   all  all includes)(    (1)  
 
where Ci indicates individual i’s allocation to his or her public account, pij indicates the 
number of units of punishment that group member i gives to member j and conversely for 
pji, so that the third term is i’s expenditure on punishing others and the fourth is i’s losses 
from being punished by others. In this case, if there is a threat of receiving more than (1 – 
m) units of punishment for each unit of endowment placed in one’s private account, it is 
privately optimal to contribute everything to the public account. However, in a finitely 
repeated game with rational, strictly self-interested agents having common knowledge that 
all are of the same type, there can be no such credible threat, since it is never privately 
optimal to punish in the last period and therefore punishing in any earlier period as a way 
of threatening to punish future free riding is not credible. In this setting, the availability of 
a punishment option makes no difference, and uniform free riding with the associated 
earnings of E per period prevails. Assuming uniform voting for the weakly dominant 
alternative, then, standard theory predicts that option (b) will be selected in favor of either 
of options (c) and (a), while individuals will be indifferent between options (a) and (c). (In 
our experiment, subjects will vote only between (b) and (c), so the operational prediction is 
that they will vote for (b).) 
 
b) Possible behavioral departures 
 
Observations from past public goods experiments suggest that standard theory does poorly 
in predicting many decisions in settings of types (a) (simple VCM) and (c) (VCM with 
punishment stage). Typically, subjects are found to contribute 40 to 60% of their 
endowments to the public account on average in the initial period (Zelmer, 2003). 
Contributions trend downwards with repetition, but are rarely uniformly zero even in the 
known last period. There is evidence of a “conditional willingness to cooperate” on the 
parts of many subjects (e.g., Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010 and Thöni et al., 2012). In 
experiments of type (c), most subjects give costly punishment at least once over the course 
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of repeated play (Falk et al., 2005 and sources cited above). While subjects mainly direct 
punishment at the lower contributors in their groups, many subject pools also exhibit 
substantial punishment of high contributors, which Cinyabuguma et al. (2006) dub 
“perverse punishment” (see also Ertan et al., 2009).5 Contrary to the prediction above that 
the availability of punishment does not alter equilibrium play, its availability at sufficiently 
low cost is associated with at least sustained if not rising contributions to the public 
account in numerous experiments (see, e.g., Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008).   
 
While less studied, the impact on contributions of formal sanctions that make 
contributing privately optimal appears largely consistent with the standard theoretical 
prediction (Putterman et al., 2011). The main departure from the standard predictions 
regarding formal sanctions is that subjects significantly increase their contributions in 
response to sanctions of too small a magnitude to render contributing privately 
profitable—i.e., “non-deterrent sanctions”—when these have been selected by the subjects 
themselves (Tyran and Feld, 2006).   
 
Two final observations that may be pertinent to predicting behavior in our 
experiment revolve around voting. First, the selection of an institution by voting may in 
and of itself influence its performance (Tyran and Feld, 2006, Dal Bó et al., 2010, Kamei, 
2013, Sutter et al., 2010). This factor might also apply to informal sanctions. For example, 
a group vote to make informal sanctions available might be interpreted as a signal that 
most members are willing to punish free-riding and that they look favorably on others 
doing so, which might cause increased deterrence for given sanctions as well as better 
targeting of whatever sanctions are imposed.  A favorable impact of voting on 
performance of IS would affect our expectations about institutional choice because if 
efficiency is high under IS, for which no fixed cost is paid, the cost that a rational subject 
should be willing to pay to have a formal sanction scheme in place is less than the initially 
predicted (m∙n – 1)∙E.  
 
                                                 
5
 Herrmann et al. (2008) refer to the overlapping phenomenon of a group member punishing one whose 
contribution was higher than her own as “anti-social punishment.”  
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Second, predicting the impact of voting is somewhat more complicated in our 
experiment than in others, including Markussen et al., because use of the formal sanction 
option by our subjects always entails first a vote on whether to employ such a scheme and 
then a vote on its precise terms. Since a vote for the formal scheme means entrusting a 
majority of fellow group members with the power to set parameters that will be binding on 
oneself, beliefs about others’ intentions and rationality assume considerable importance.  If 
we find frequent choice of IS in our design, it could thus in part be reflecting subjects’ 
uncertainties about one another’s next stage voting behaviors.   
  Finally,  formal social preference models can be used to generate predictions of 
behavior by subjects of varying type. Markussen et al. do this using a modified version of 
a model in Charness and Rabin (2002) (and in their appendix, also Fehr and Schmidt, 
1999). Many of their predictions carry over to our setting and measure up well against both 
sets of data; we refer the reader to their paper for details.    
 
c) Literature 
 
Experimental studies of endogenous choice of institutions for collective action 
began with work of Yamagishi (1986), who offered subjects in a version of the public 
goods game in which the return from own contribution is zero the opportunity to 
voluntarily fund a mechanism for penalizing free riders.  Any money placed in the 
punishment fund generated twice as large a loss for the lowest contributor to the public 
good.  The mechanism proved successful in raising contributions to the public good.  
Another important study is Ostrom et al. (1992), who let subjects communicate and decide 
whether to use sanctions on overharvesting to achieve greater efficiency in a common pool 
resource game. The combination of communication and sanctions is effective at raising 
efficiency, in their study. 
More recently, Botelho et al. (2005), Gürerk et al. (2006), Ertan et al. (2009), and 
Sutter et al. (2010) have studied whether subjects will choose to face a voluntary 
contribution dilemma that permits or one that does not permit informal sanctions. Botelho 
et al. and Sutter et al. implement experimental designs in which subjects make a single 
choice over using or not using an informal sanction mechanism (and, in Sutter et al. also 
informal rewards). Both papers find informal sanctions to be unpopular. Gürerk et al. and 
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Ertan et al.’s designs include a series of choices between sanction-free and sanction-
permitting schemes, and both find that informal sanctions are unpopular at the outset but 
become increasingly popular with experience—which indicates that evolution of 
institutional choices may also be important to study.  Our study’s institutional choice 
mechanism, voting, makes it more like Ertan et al., e.g., than like Gürerk et al., which uses 
‘voting with one’s feet,’ and Yamagishi, in which institutional choice is associated with 
the voluntary funding of an exogenously present mechanism for which no alternatives are 
offered.  
 
 
A more recent study by Traulsen et al. (2012) builds on Yamagishi’s by comparing 
a formal style punishment mechanism, “pool punishment,” to an informal or individual 
punishment opportunity, adding punishment of those who fail to punish in some 
treatments. In one treatment, subjects individually select between the two kinds of 
punishment, and pool punishment emerges most popular.  Traulsen et al. and the closely 
related theoretical study of Sigmund et al. (2010) resemble our research in that they study 
choice of up-front and centralized vs. ex post and decentralized sanctioning, but they differ 
in that contributions to the centralized punishment pool remain voluntary, that the 
institutional choice emerges without voting, and that the targeting and intensity of pool 
punishment are exogenous.
6
  Traulsen et al. report that their “experimental results show 
how organized punishment could have displaced individual punishment in human 
societies.”         
The study of institutional choice through voting on formal sanctions begins with 
Tyran and Feld (2006), who let some subjects vote on whether to impose on themselves a 
“mild law”—i.e., non-deterrent sanction.  In another treatment, the same sanction is 
imposed or not imposed exogenously. Some 60% of groups offered the choice choose the 
mild law and achieve higher efficiency than either those in the exogenous or endogenous 
no law and in the exogenous mild law conditions. In an experiment on spillover effects of 
democracy, Kamei (2013) also lets subjects vote on the introduction of a mild sanction in a 
VCM, finding that pro-sanction subjects cooperated significantly more when the law was 
endogenously, rather than exogenously, imposed. 
                                                 
6
 Also closely related is Zhang et al. (forthcoming), which we discuss it briefly in footnote 26,  below. 
 12 
To our knowledge, studying choice by vote between informal and formal sanction 
regimes in the VCM commences with Markussen et al. (forthcoming) and the present 
paper.
 
 Subjects in the former decide which institution to use (and in some treatments, also 
consider the option of a sanction free institution), but the terms of the formal sanction 
regime are dictated exogenously, with between-subject variation. While hypotheses on 
voting are more easily derived by formal analysis in such an environment, studying choice 
of institutions when the sanctions schemes in question are structured by those using them 
is nonetheless of interest in its own right. With endogenous choice of scheme parameters, 
as mentioned, subjects can vote to sanction high contributors, just as some individuals 
punish perversely in an informal sanctions regime. We can also obtain observations of 
individuals interacting under an informal sanctions regime and test whether tendencies to 
cooperate by contributing or to behave anti-socially by punishing high contributors predict 
votes about the formal scheme’s parameters. We can examine, too, choices between 
deterrent and non-deterrent sanctions and investigate how decisions about scheme 
parameters change over time. 
Studying choice between formal and informal sanction schemes when formal 
scheme parameters are endogenous is also important as a check on a potential bias that the 
formal schemes used in Markussen et al. might introduce. Because the available formal 
schemes there specify punishment of low contributors only, the very presence of this 
option and its explication to subjects in the instructions might have cued subjects to the 
idea that punishing low contributors is what sanctions (including informal ones) are for. 
Most experimental instructions used by economists since Fehr and Gӓchter (2000), by 
contrast, have worked hard to avoid any such suggestion in order that any sanctioning that 
emerges be truly endogenous. By offering subjects more general-purpose formal schemes 
that can be used to penalize either high or low contributors, our design preserves the more 
neutral environment of the earlier cooperation-and-punishment literature. This allows us to 
check whether the generally efficient performance of informal sanctions in Markussen et 
al. was substantially influenced by the restricted nature of the formal schemes available. 
A first step towards studying the endogenous design of a formal sanction scheme is 
taken in Putterman et al. (2011). There, presence of an exogenous formal sanctions scheme 
is given, but it is left to subjects to determine by vote the level of sanctions and whether it 
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is contributions to the public or to the private accounts that are subject to them. In the 
event, seven of eight groups select fully efficient sanction schemes by their third of five 
votes, indicating that most subjects gravitate towards efficient sanctions but that some 
learning is entailed.
7
  
 
3. Experimental Design 
 
At the heart of our experiment are six VCM treatments in which subjects have 
opportunities to choose between informal and formal sanction schemes. In two of these 
treatments participants are inexperienced with the sanction mechanisms when voting for 
the first time, whereas in the other four, participants are exogenously assigned substantial 
experience with each scheme before voting, affording a check of whether experienced 
subjects vote differently from inexperienced ones.
8
 The experiment also includes a main 
control treatment without sanctions, and three special control treatments discussed later.  
In all treatments, groups have n = 5 subjects (partner matching). Each subject is 
provided at the beginning of each period with a fixed endowment of E = 20 points (34 
points = $1), and is asked to make a series of decisions on the allocation of that 
endowment between a private and a public account. The marginal per capita return 
(MPCR) is m = 0.4. We set the number of periods of play at 24 to allow for the evolution 
of institutional choice over time, and we group the periods into six phases of four periods, 
with a group’s institution remaining fixed within a phase. Given this structure, subjects 
choose institution by voting 3 times in the treatments in which they are first exposed to a 
no-sanctions regime (NS), FS and IS exogenously (3-Vote treatments), but do so 6 times in 
treatments without such exposure (6-Vote treatments). Voting is simultaneous, mandatory, 
and free, with each subject indicating a preference for either IS or FS and groups learning 
the outcome of the majority vote but not the number of subjects voting for it.  
                                                 
7
 Because of the greater overall complexity of our design, we simplified choices regarding the formal scheme 
relative to those in Putterman et al., reducing the number of decisions required from three to two. In 
particular, subjects in that paper but not the present one are asked to determine the scope of a potentially 
penalty free range (“exemption”), whereas this possibility is not mentioned and hence the exemption range is 
automatically of size zero in our design. 
8
 For example, subjects in Gürerk et al., Ertan et al., and Markussen et al. show initial reluctance to adopt IS. 
If IS is beneficial to most subjects in practice, then by having subjects experience IS early on exogenously, 
the 3-vote treatments might induce a higher proportion of votes for it than do the 6-vote ones, with voting 
from the start.  
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Table 1 provides an overview of our six main and three additional treatments, with 
the rows distinguishing number of votes and order of exogenous conditions, the columns, 
whether there is a fixed cost of adopting a formal sanction scheme. In all treatments, 
subjects start by playing a VCM in an NS regime for at least one period so as to familiarize 
them with the nature of the social dilemma. In 3-Vote (see upper panels), subjects play a 
series of three 4 period phases, the first under exogenously imposed NS, followed by either 
a phase under IS and one under FS (dubbed IF order, upper two cells) or a phase under FS 
and one under IS (next two cells, dubbed FI order). In the last three phases, groups play 
with either FS or IS, depending on the outcome of the vote in their group. The FS 
treatments in the left column carry no fixed administrative cost, those in the right column a 
fixed cost of 5 points per group member and period. The treatment order and 
administrative cost (none = N, 5 point cost = C) is indicated as follows: 3(IF)-N, 3(IF)-C, 
3(FI)-N and 3(FI)-C.
9
  
In the 6-Vote treatments, subjects play a single period in NS condition followed by 
six phases, played under each group’s majority choice of either FS or IS, also determined 
in start-of-phase votes. Since there are no exogenous order differences among the 6-Vote 
treatments, they are distinguished only as 6-N and 6-C. The sanction-free BASELINE 
treatment and the three additional treatments listed in the dashed cells of Table 1 are 
discussed later.  
Figure 1 shows the timing of events.
10
 When IS are in place, the contribution stage 
is followed by a punishment stage in which each subject i assigns points pij {0, 1, 2, …, 
10} to each other group member j. The contribution of each j is shown in random order. 
Each point of punishment costs the recipient four points (P = 4 in Equation (1)), except if 
received punishment exceeds first stage earnings, in which case first stage earnings minus 
                                                 
9
 While group size, endowments, and MPCR are identical in our study and Markussen et al., our fixed costs 
of 0 and 5 differ from theirs, 2 and 8, allowing in an approximate sense for a kind of meta-robustness check. 
In the event, both studies find similar differences between their low (0 or 2) and their high (5 or 8) cost 
treatments, while between the two studies, the share of cooperative surplus needing to be spent by each 
subject in order to adopt FS includes 0% (cost of 0), 10% (2), 25% (5) and 40% (8). Unlike our design, 
however, subjects in Markussen et al. face no variable cost of FS (see below).  
10
 In all treatments, subjects are informed at the outset about the number of phases and periods and that they 
will interact in the same group of five anonymous participants throughout. In 3-Vote treatments, subjects 
learn about the conditions in four distinct sets of instructions, one before each phase of exogenous play and 
one before the start of voting between schemes, whereas in 6-Vote treatments, they receive one set of 
instructions before the initial phase and a second set of instructions explaining all of the remaining elements 
before the second phase. See the Appendix for further details.  
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received punishment is set to 0.
11
 Period earnings could nevertheless become negative 
because the cost of imposing punishment is always incurred, with any one period’s losses 
being taken from the accumulated earnings of other periods. Thus, period earnings under 
IS are given by 
 
     ij jiij ijij ji ppCC   all  all includes 0,44.0)20(max     (2) 
       
 
which differs from Eq. (1) by substitution of specific values for E, m and P and by the 
bound on the cost of punishment received, as indicated by the max function.
 12
 
Having selected the FS regime, groups determine what action is sanctioned and at 
what rate. In each FS period, subjects first vote on whether to sanction allocations to the 
private or the public account and learn the outcome of the majority vote. Each then 
chooses a sanction rate from the set 0, 0.4, 0.8 and 1.2 points, with the median rate being 
implemented for (and it alone revealed to) the group. Subjects then make their contribution 
decisions, are shown one another’s contributions in a random order, and learn their 
earnings for the period. For each point a group member allocates to the account in 
question, he loses an amount equal to the chosen sanction rate with certainty. Note that 
when contributions to the private account are sanctioned, a subject’s privately optimal 
strategy remains zero contribution if a rate of 0 or 0.4 is set but is contributing her full 
endowment if the rate is set at 0.8 or 1.2 points (see equation (3)).  
One reason Markussen et al. made the terms of FS regimes exogenous was to avoid 
raising the possibility of strategic voting, which complicates theoretical predictions. If all 
subjects are strictly self-interested, perfectly rational, and have common knowledge of this, 
and if we adopt the assumption that each subject votes her preferences due to the 
                                                 
11
 See Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) on the relation between efficiency and the cost ratio P, including at a 
1:4 ratio. This ratio is also used in numerous studies, including Page et al. (2005), Bochet et al. (2006), Önes 
and Putterman (2007), and Sutter et al. (2010). An effective ratio of 1:4 or more often obtains for the first 
point of punishment i assigns to j in Fehr and Gӓchter (2000) and in the numerous experiments adopting its 
punishment schedule. Markussen et al. (forthcoming) mainly use the same 1:4 ratio but also consider 
robustness to lower sanction effectiveness, finding surprisingly little effect.  
12
 In practice, maximum punishment is rare and nullifies first-stage incomes only occasionally. For example, 
of the 1090 instances in which a subject i punished another subject j, only 5 (0.5%) involved giving 10 points 
of punishment. Punishment received exceeded first stage earnings in only 23 of 2960 subject-periods (0.8%). 
Finally, punishment almost never resulted in losses to the punisher. Only 5 of the 2960 subject-periods 
(0.2%) under IS saw a subject incur negative earnings for the period, and all subjects had strictly positive 
earnings overall. 
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possibility of being pivotal, then strategic voting should not be an issue, because it is the 
best outcome for each that there be a deterrent formal sanction, which shifts the predicted 
equilibrium from full free riding and earning 20 points per period to full contributions and 
earning 40 minus the fixed cost (0 or 5) per period. However, dropping any of the three 
assumptions (self-interest, rationality, common knowledge) makes strategic voting a 
possible concern. For example, subjects who for some reason want to avoid having any 
sanctions at all may vote for FS, then if the group has an FS majority outcome, vote for 
penalizing high contributors, in the expectation that if that choice prevails, others will join 
in selecting a sanction rate of zero. We undertook our experimental study despite the 
difficulty of providing exhaustive voting predictions because we believe that studying 
institutional choice in this somewhat more realistic setting is an important empirical 
complement to Markussen et al.’s approach.  
For parallelism with IS, we made groups bear a variable cost of imposing 
sanctions, as well as the possible fixed cost. If a group member is sanctioned, one third of 
the amount deducted from that member’s earnings is also charged to the group as a whole 
and is divided equally among the five members, meaning each individually pays an 
amount equaling (1/3)*(1/5)=1/15 of the sanctioned individual’s loss. With the other four 
collectively paying 4/15 of the sanction loss and the sanctioned member bearing the same 
cost of sanction imposition, for a total loss of (16/15) times the sanction, the ratio of cost 
collectively born by the others to cost to the sanctioned individual is thus 1:4, exactly as in 
IS.
13
 The cost of imposing sanctions, including the fixed cost, is always borne by each 
individual even if it makes her earnings for the period negative, whereas the effective 
sanction itself cannot exceed the individual’s first stage earnings for the period—both 
features being as in IS. Thus, an individual’s earnings under FS are given by 
 
  fppCC
ij jiij ji
  includesincludes 15
1
0,4.0)20(max
  (3)
 
 
                                                 
13
 If the fixed costs of FS can be thought of as representing among other things, costs of building and 
maintaining prisons and court houses, the variable ones might correspond to the costs of pursuing criminals 
and conducting trials, which depend on how many rule violations occur. We made the ratio the same for both 
kinds of sanctions and referred to the uniformity of 1:4 ratio under the two schemes in the instructions so that 
the difference in variable cost per sanction would not in itself influence subjects’ votes (see Appendix A).  
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where pi = r∙(20 – Ci) is the imposed sanction if contributing to the private account is 
penalized,
14
 with r {0.0, 0.4, 0.8, 1.2} being the sanction rate, and f {0, 5}, depending 
on the treatment, the fixed or administrative cost of FS. As should be clear from equations 
(2) and (3), the costs of a sanction scheme and of any fines paid are lost and are not 
redistributed to subjects in any way. 
In the BASELINE treatment, subjects play the standard VCM game in NS mode 
for all six phases. To control for restart effects (Andreoni, 1988), phases are separated by a 
break of 40 seconds to parallel the breaks for voting or instructions in the other treatments. 
As in the other treatments, feedback about other individuals’ contributions to the public 
account is presented in a random order each period.  
We try to present instructions for all treatments in natural language but avoid terms 
that might suggest that contributing to the public account is desirable. For example, we use 
“allocate” rather than “contribute,” “assign reduction points” rather than “punish” or 
“sanction.” In an exception to our verbal neutrality, we use “fine” to describe the FS 
scheme, but we indicate that this can be a fine for allocating points to the private or to the 
public account. The schemes voted on are called “individual reduction decisions” (= IS) 
and “group-determined fines” (= FS), and the fixed cost of FS, in the treatments including 
it, is called a “fixed administrative cost of having a fine scheme in operation.”  
 
All treatments also include one additional task before the main experiment and two 
at the end. These tasks were included to gauge subjects’ conditional inclinations to 
cooperate, IQ, and political orientation, factors which help to explain the heterogeneity of 
behavior in some settings. 
15
  
 
4. Results 
 
The experiment 
 
Twenty sessions, including six for the additional treatments discussed later, were 
conducted in a computer lab at Brown University during 2009 -2011 with a total of 375 
                                                 
14
 pi = r∙ Ci if contributing to the public account is penalized. 
15
 Our online Appendix provides the full instructions for these tasks. The indicators constructed from them 
are as in Putterman et al. (2011). An exception to the statement that all subjects completed these tasks 
concerns subjects in the Fuller Information treatments discussed at the end of Section 4.  The IQ and political 
orientation questions were left out of those treatments to conserve time.  
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undergraduate subjects drawn from the full range of disciplines.
16
 Subjects were paid 
privately in cash at the end of their session, with average earnings of $24.50 for the main 
portion of the experiment.
17
  
 
a) Voting for formal vs. informal sanctions 
 
Summary: Three findings on this institutional choice stand out. First, formal sanctions are 
not as popular as predicted by standard economic theory. Second, fixed cost matters more 
than such theory predicts. Third, the order in which schemes are exogenously experienced 
has no significant effect. 
Figure 2(a) shows the pattern of voting outcomes over time, with the data grouped 
into 3-Vote and 6-Vote treatments and treatments with and without administrative cost in 
the FS scheme. A summary of individual votes and group outcomes is provided in 
Appendix Table B.2. Contrary to the prediction of standard theory that subjects would 
uniformly select formal over informal sanctions, the choice between the two schemes 
favors formal sanctions over informal ones by a relatively narrow margin (102 group votes 
versus 81 group votes), with the administrative cost of FS serving as a major 
discouragement of that system’s use. Whereas 75 out of 87 group votes (86%) favored FS 
over IS in the no administrative cost treatments, the corresponding numbers were 27 out of 
96 votes (28%) in treatments with 5 point administrative cost to operate FS. The relative 
popularities of the two institutions and the impact of the fixed cost of FS parallel the 
findings of Markussen et al., demonstrating the applicability of their findings that IS is 
popular and that fixed cost is the key influence on institutional choice over a broader range 
of fixed costs and, more importantly, to environments in which subjects control the terms 
of the formal sanction scheme.  
The order in which subjects are exogenously exposed to the FS and IS conditions 
in the 3-Vote treatments appears to have had no effect on choice of scheme in phases 4, 5 
                                                 
16
 An experimenter read all instructions aloud as participants read along. Subjects answered control questions 
after each set of instructions to test comprehension.  In 3-Vote treatments, questions were taken and 
answered after the reading of instructions before each of phases 1 though 4. In 6-Vote treatments, questions 
were taken and answered after the reading of instructions before phases 0 and 1, and in BASELINE, after the 
reading of the only instructions, those before phase 1. The experiment was programmed in z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). 
17
 All subjects also earned a show-up fee of $5.00. In the IQ portion completed by the 300 subjects in the 
main treatments, earnings averaged $2.20. 
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and 6 (see Appendix B.2). We therefore pool the two 3-N treatments and the two 3-C 
treatments in the remainder of our analysis, although an order dummy variable is included 
when we estimate regressions.  
  
b) Voting on what to sanction in the formal scheme 
 
Summary: Although only a few voting outcomes are for sanctioning allocations to the 
public account, about an eighth of individual votes in total are cast for this option. In 
treatments in which exogenous punishing opportunities precede voting (3-C, 3-N), 
perverse informal punishers vote this way significantly more often than do other subjects. 
When sanctioning allocations to the private accounts, groups usually pick the most severe 
sanction available.  
The 102 group votes in favor of FS are each followed by four period-specific votes 
on that scheme’s two parameters, for a total of 408 group and 2,040 individual votes on 
each dimension. There are another 124 group and 620 individual votes on each parameter 
during periods of exogenous FS play in the 3-vote treatments. 97.7% of group voting 
outcomes are for sanctioning contributions to the private rather than public accounts (see 
Appendix Table B.1). Still, 13.3% of individual votes favor sanctioning contributions to 
the public accounts—a proportion of “perverse voting” that approaches but is somewhat 
less than the share of punishment perversely directed at high contributors in past 
experiments with the same university subject pool (e.g. Ertan et al.).  
We estimate random effects probit regressions to investigate what individual-
specific factors account for subjects’ votes to penalize contributions to the public versus 
the private accounts, when FS is in place.  Estimating separately by treatment and for 
periods of endogenous versus exogenous FS, our explanatory variables are subjects’ 
average conditional contribution, IQ, political orientation, gender, an indicator for 
engaging in perverse punishment and another for having received such punishment during 
the exogenous IS phase, and period. In all treatments for which the perverse punishment 
variables are obtained, perverse punishers are significantly more likely to vote to penalize 
contributions to the public rather than private accounts (in other words, to vote for 
perverse formal sanctions). In the regressions for the 3-N treatment, higher average 
conditional contribution is associated with voting to penalize contributions to the private 
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accounts (i.e., “voting non-perversely”), significant at the 5% or 10% levels. (For details, 
see Appendix Table B.3).  The remaining variables are usually insignificant. Thus, we find 
evidence that individuals’ orientations towards cooperation, as indicated by both 
contribution and punishment behavior, impact their voting on the targeting of the formal 
sanction scheme.  The out-voting of subjects disinclined to cooperate by ones favorably 
inclined towards cooperation helps to explain why almost 98% of majority votes supported 
efficient targeting.     
 
c) Voting on the formal sanction rate 
Following the 520 group votes for penalizing allocations to the private accounts, about 90 
percent of groups chose a binding sanction (433 chose penalty rate 1.2 and 34 chose rate 
0.8).
18
 In contrast, in every period in which a group had chosen to penalize contributions to 
their public account, its majority set the penalty rate at 0.  
 
Figure 2(b) shows the proportion of median votes cast, thus the rates that went into 
effect, among the observed options. One interesting observation is that while choosing to 
penalize contributions to private accounts at the maximum rate of 1.2 is the preponderant 
choice (89.2% of votes) in the treatments without administrative cost, its dominance is less 
overwhelming (65.1% of votes) in the treatments with administrative cost, perhaps 
because subjects were reluctant to add to the fixed cost of 5 points per period that they 
already bore when using FS (a kind of sunk cost fallacy, if r < 0.8 is chosen). There are 
also indications of a learning process, with the share of (FS-using) groups fining 
contributions to private accounts at the maximum rate rising from less than half in Phase 1 
to 100% in Phases 5 and 6 of the 6-vote treatments.
19
  
 
d) Contribution levels and trends by condition 
                                                 
18
 At the individual level, in cases in which formal sanctions were directed at contributing to the private 
accounts, 71.3% of votes were for the 1.2 rate, 5.4% for 0.8, 4.5% for 0.4 and 18.9 % for 0.0. 
19
 See Appendix Table B.2 (d).  In our working paper, we discuss regressions using individual characteristics 
to predict subjects’ votes on the sanction rate when contributions to the private accounts are fined; see 
Appendix Table B.4. Estimates in several of the regressions suggest that either higher IQ or more 
conditionally cooperative subjects or both tended to vote for higher sanction rates. While the number of 
periods and groups in which contributions to the public account were sanctioned was too small to analyze 
using regressions, we note that only 15% of the relevant votes on rates were for positive sanction rates, and 
that those votes came disproportionately from participants who were perverse punishers during play under 
IS. 
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Summary: Both IS and FS increase contributions, with the two being equally effective in 
later phases. FS also increase contributions in cases in which a theoretically non-deterrent 
sanction rate is chosen. 
The left panel of Figure 3 displays the average contribution to the public account 
by period and condition, distinguishing between formal and informal sanctions schemes 
when imposed exogenously (in Phases 2 and 3 of 3-Vote treatments) versus when adopted 
by vote (all phases of 6-Vote treatments and remaining phases of 3-Vote treatments). The 
dashed curve shows that in the BASELINE treatment and in Phase 1 of the 3-Vote 
treatments, with no sanctions (NS), contributions follow the familiar pattern of beginning 
around 50% of endowment and declining with repetition.
20
  The remaining curves, in 
contrast, show that groups interacting under either sanctions regime, whether with 
exogenous or endogenous regime choice, exhibit strong upward trends in contributions in 
Phases 1 – 3 and stable and high contributions above 90% of endowment in Phases 4 – 6. 
In all phases providing sufficient observations for testing, contributions are significantly 
higher with either IS or FS than in both Phase 1 and BASELINE treatment NS.  
Comparing the impacts of IS and FS, we find that with both voted and exogenous 
sanctions, average contributions are higher in the first three phases of using sanctions 
when FS is used than when IS is used. This difference is sometimes statistically significant, 
but always economically small relative to the difference between either regime and NS 
(see Figure 3 (a)). In the last three phases, moreover, contributions do not significantly 
differ between FS and IS (see Appendix for details).  
 
To see how the severity of sanctions affects contributions, consider Figure 4, which 
shows average contribution by phase under formal sanctions, disaggregated by sanctions 
rate but pooling observations from all treatments (including those in which formal 
sanctions are imposed exogenously). For reference, average contribution under NS (in 
Phase 1 of 3-Vote treatments and all phases of BASELINE treatment) is indicated by the 
dots in the middle of each set of bars (with the dashed line indicating the contribution 
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 The fact that contributions fluctuate without trend during periods 5 – 18 is also not unusual given the 
partner matching protocol in which there may be attempts to restart cooperation, possibly facilitated by the 
pause in play following each set of four periods (see again Andreoni, 1988). 
 22 
trend). Although the average contribution is lower at sanction rate 0.4 than at the higher, 
formally deterrent rates, the difference in early phases is surprisingly small.   In all phases 
in which they are observed, FS of rate 0.4 yields higher contributions than NS, a finding 
consistent with past evidence of sensitivity of contributions to the MPCR but that may also 
reflect a signalling or voting effect, as with the non-deterrent sanctions in Tyran and Feld 
(2006). Average contributions are also higher at sanction rate 0 of the FS regime than in 
the NS regime in five out of six phases, but the difference is generally small, and there are 
too few group level observations to test for significance.  
 
e) Punishment under informal sanctions condition 
 
Summary: Punishment in IS is mostly targeted at low contributors and is effective in that 
those who are punished increase their contributions. 
75.3% of subjects who play at least one phase in IS condition engage in costly 
punishment at least once, with 53.4% (17.4%) engaging in costly punishment in more than 
one out of four (one out of two) of those occasions in which group members contributed 
unequal amounts. Panel (b) of Figure 3 shows, separately for endogenous and exogenous 
IS, the average informal sanctions given per subject (one fourth the amount lost by those 
targeted). For both endogenous and exogenous IS, sanctions begin at around 1.6 points per 
subject and decline with repetition, reaching 0.4 or less points per subject in later periods 
of endogenous IS. The amount of perverse punishment, also displayed, is relatively small:  
on average, less than 8% of punishment points goes to groups’ above-median contributors. 
Regressions (for details, see Appendix Table B.6) show punishment of low contributors in 
the previous period to be strongly associated with increases in their contributions, while 
punishment of high contributors is associated with mild decreases, justifying its 
description as perverse. The uptick in punishment in period 24 confirms that punishment is 
not entirely strategic in nature (compare Falk et al., 2005). 
 
f) Effect of sanctions on earnings 
 
Summary: Practice with IS improve performance. In later phases, IS generate higher 
earnings than FS with fixed costs (and about the same as FS without fixed costs). IS are in 
fact so well-targeted that they make contributing profitable. 
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In the social dilemma faced by our subjects, each can earn 40 points per period if 
all contribute their full endowments to the public accounts versus 20 if all fully free ride, 
as is individually rational taking one another’s contributions as given. The possibility of 
sanctions can resolve this dilemma, but does so most efficiently when sanctioning costs are 
avoided, i.e. when the expectation of sanctions suffices to deter free-riding.  
Figure 5 shows average earnings in early and late phases of the experiment under 
FS, IS, and NS conditions, with panels (a) and (b) showing the data for 3-Vote treatments 
respectively without and with administrative cost, and panels (c) and (d) the data for 6-
Vote treatments likewise distinguished. For purposes of comparison, average earnings in 
the BASELINE treatment are also shown (identically) in each panel. We group the early 
and late phases to check for impacts of experience or learning. The figure shows that the 
earnings achieved under IS were appreciably higher in the later than in the earlier phases 
in both 3- and 6-vote treatments, while earnings under FS show smaller gains, mainly in 
the 6-Vote treatments. Wilcoxon signed rank tests find that the change in earnings over 
time is statistically significant for the IS but not the FS condition.   
Comparing IS and FS earnings during given phases, the figure shows higher 
average earnings under FS than under IS in the early periods.
21
 In phases 4 – 6, average 
earnings under IS exceed those with FS in treatments with administrative cost, with the 
difference being statistically significant in the 3-vote treatments. Even when there is no 
administrative cost, IS achieves similar efficiency to FS after experience, although it is not 
chosen often enough to test for statistical significance of the difference.  
 
An observed feature of IS experiments is that efficiency may increase over time if 
contributions rise while the amount of sanctioning falls (see Gächter, Renner and Sefton, 
2008). Such a pattern is exhibited by the data in Figure 3, and its impact on earnings is 
confirmed by Figure 5. On average, subjects earned 31.1 points per period during the first 
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 The difference is significant in Phase 2 and also in Phase 3 for the 3-Vote treatments without 
administrative cost, but not for those with that cost. The test can’t be carried out for the 6-N treatment 
because only one group voted for IS. See Appendix Table B.8. 
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phase in which their group used IS, versus 36.6 in the last such phase, a difference 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level according to a Wilcoxon Signed Rank test.
22
  
 
An interesting question regarding informal sanctions is whether earnings are on 
average higher for those members of a group who contribute more, due to the presence of 
punishment. To investigate, we estimate subject-level regressions with individual fixed 
effects and robust standard errors clustered by group. The dependent variable is earnings 
and the independent variables are individual contribution and a constant. We find (see 
Appendix Table B.9, part (1)) that contribution is a significant positive predictor of 
earnings, meaning that informal sanctions did in fact reverse the incentive to free ride.  
 
g) Explaining individuals’ votes between institutions 
 
Summary: Following exogenous experience, subjects tend to vote for the scheme under 
which they had earned more on average, without significant impact of earnings variation 
or of individual-specific characteristics. An exception is that higher IQ subjects are more 
likely to vote for IS in the C and for FS in the N treatments, correctly anticipating the 
scheme that yields higher observed earnings under the relevant fixed cost.  
Figure 5 shows that in the second half of each session, whether earnings were 
higher under IS or FS depends largely on the absence or presence of an administrative cost 
when FS is used. The preponderance of voting for IS in the C and for FS in the N 
treatments looks rational in view of these patterns. Because neither sanction scheme 
dominates the other at all times and because subjects received no feedback about outcomes 
in groups other than their own, it remains interesting to study the impact of earnings on 
voting between schemes by estimating a series of probit regressions that also control for 
possible effects of cooperative orientation, intelligence, and other individual 
characteristics. 
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 The calculation and test includes any group using IS in at least two phases, regardless of whether 
exogenous or endogenous. We also tested for a trend in earnings under IS by estimating a linear regression 
whose dependent variable is average earnings per group per phase using IS, and whose independent variable 
is the number of phases the group has used IS thus far {=1, 2, …}. We include group fixed effects. The 
number of phases the group has used IS obtains a positive coefficient of 1.75 which is significant at the 1% 
level. 
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The regressions, shown in Appendix Table B.10, use observations for the votes of 
Phases 4 – 6 of the 3-vote treatments, in which a measure of relative earnings under both 
schemes is always available thanks to the early exogenous phases. We pool observations 
across exogenous condition orders while including a dummy for order, but we separate the 
observations of treatments without and with administrative cost. Except in our most basic 
specification, we include the ratio of the coefficients of variation of earnings under the two 
schemes, as experienced by the individual subject, to check whether variability of earnings 
matters. Additional regressions add as controls binary indicators of whether a subject gave 
or received perverse punishment during exogenously imposed periods under IS, with or 
without controls for three personal characteristics. Self-reported political orientation is 
included to see whether more politically conservative individuals are less supportive of the 
intervention entailed by FS, as in Putterman et al. (2011). The other included 
characteristics are IQ and gender.
23
 
All estimates have significant positive coefficients on past relative earnings, 
indicating that subjects indeed tended to vote for the system under which they had 
experienced higher earnings on average. Coefficients on the treatment order dummy and 
on the ratio of experienced coefficients of variation are uniformly insignificant. In both 
regressions for the treatments without FS fixed cost, subjects who displayed anti-social 
inclinations by punishing high contributors are found to be significantly less likely to vote 
for a formal sanction scheme. More interestingly, all four coefficients on IQ are significant 
at the 5% level or better, but with opposite signs in the fixed cost and no fixed cost 
treatments. Higher IQ subjects are thus more likely to favor the scheme that proves most 
efficient ex post in each treatment. None of the other variables is statistically significant. 
 
h) Did endogenous choice increase the efficiency of sanctions? 
 
Summary: Endogenous IS are more effective than imposed IS, although the difference is 
only marginally significant. The result may be due in part to self-selection of cooperative 
types into IS. 
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 Average conditional contribution is simply the average of the individual’s 21 entries in the form indicating 
what he or she chooses to contribute assuming others on average contribute 0, 1, …, 20. While Fischbacher 
et al. (2001) classify subjects as conditional cooperators, free riders, etc., in Putterman et al. ( 2011) we find 
average conditional contribution to be as good an indicator of conditional willingness to cooperate as 
individual type dummies or other measures based on the conditional contribution schedule. 
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Because the levels of contributions and efficiency observed under endogenous IS 
regimes in the 6-Vote treatments and in phases 4 – 6 of the 3-Vote treatments are relatively 
high compared to others in the literature, it is possible that part of the efficiency of voted 
IS could be due to a signaling or other effect of having been chosen democratically. To 
investigate, we conducted two sessions, each with three groups, collecting six observations 
of a treatment in which groups operated under the IS condition as a result of its exogenous 
imposition, rather than of voting. The test treatment (the Exogenous IS Comparison 
Treatment) was structured identically to treatment 6-C—which provides the most play 
under voted IS— except that in the instructions before Phase 1, when the IS and FS 
conditions were explained to subjects, they were told that the condition under which they 
would play each phase would be determined by the computer, with no mention being made 
of the possibility of voting.
24
 In fact, the computer program assigned the subjects in all 
groups of this treatment to the IS condition in every phase, so that six group-level 
observations could be collected paralleling the groups in the 6-C treatment that voted for, 
and thus played under, the IS condition in each of phases 1– 6.  
 
Appendix Figure B.4 plots average contribution and earnings by period in the four 
6-C groups that voted to use IS in all periods and in the six groups of the Exogenous IS 
Comparison Treatment. On average, both contributions and earnings are considerably 
higher in 6-C groups, which used IS by choice, than in the comparison treatment groups 
that did so exogenously. The difference is considerable in economic terms—more than 6 
points (30% of endowment) on average (see Appendix Figure B.4). Due to performance 
variation among the observations of each treatment, however, the differences are 
statistically significant only at the 10% level and only if one-tailed tests are used, as would 
be appropriate for testing a one-sided hypothesis that endogenous choice raises 
contributions and earnings.
25
 Interestingly, we find indications that more cooperatively 
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 Subjects in the comparison treatment had not participated in any other treatment and with high likelihood 
had no knowledge that similar experiments had been conducted that included voting. The instructions 
described both IS and FS schemes and indicated that one or the other would be assigned in any given phase, 
with the assignment not being influenced by subjects’ behaviors.  
25
 We report Mann-Whitney tests at group level in Appendix Table B.12. We test the group-level 
observations of each phase separately so that cross-sectional observations in each test are independent of one 
another, although a given group’s observations are not independent across phases.  Markussen et al. 
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inclined subjects self-selected into use of the IS regime in the 6-C Treatment (see 
Appendix Table B.13). Our findings are thus consistent with the possibility that allowing 
groups to choose their institutions is efficiency-enhancing in our experiment in part 
because it lets heterogeneous individuals self-select into institutions that suit them better.
26
 
However, this need not rule out the possibility of a direct effect of voting, for instance that 
group members took others’ votes for IS as an indication of intention to punish free riding. 
 
i) How does IS perform when counter-punishment is possible? 
    
Summary: Facilitating counter-punishment by letting subjects know who punished them 
does not undermine the effectiveness of IS in our experiment. 
An important issue regarding the efficacy of informal sanctioning schemes was 
raised by Nikiforakis (2008), who pointed out that subjects in most experimental IS 
treatments are shielded from being punished back by those whom they punish due to 
absence of feedback about who punished whom by how much. When punished subjects 
are fully informed about the punishment they receive from each other group member and 
are given a distinct and immediate opportunity to counter-punish, Nikiforakis finds that 
earnings losses from punishing rise and that first-order punishment of free riders falls, thus 
eliminating the pattern of rising contributions usually associated with IS. This raises the 
possibility that the surprising popularity of IS despite availability of FS in our experiment 
would be sharply diminished if subjects could counter-punish in the IS regime.  
To address this issue, we conducted two additional treatments that parallel the 6-C 
and endogenous IS comparison treatments except that (a) group members are provided 
with permanent identities and (b) information about their most recent and also earlier past 
punishments of one another is available alongside individual contribution information at 
each punishment stage (see the two “fuller information” treatments listed in the outer-right 
column of Table 1, and for treatment details, the Appendix). We find that the efficiency-
                                                                                                                                                   
(forthcoming) also find contributions to be significantly higher in endogenously chosen than in exogenously 
imposed IS.  In their data, the difference is statistically significant at the 5% level in a two-tailed test.  
26
 There are differences as well as similarities to the results in Zhang et al. (2013). There, subjects choose 
between IS and a more centralized type of “pool punishment” by voting with their feet, similar to subjects in 
Gürerk et al. (2006), whereas in our majority voting setup a minority must live with the preferred institution 
of a group’s majority.  Zhang et al.’s pool punishment resembles efficiently targeted FS in that it targets all 
free riders and calls for payment up front even if no free riding occurs, but differs from FS in that 
contributions to the punishment pool remain individual decisions.  
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enhancing properties of the informal sanctions scheme are if anything strengthened by the 
inclusion of the additional feedback. Also, comparing the fuller information treatments 
having exogenous versus endogenous choice of sanctioning scheme when the alternative is 
costly FS, we find again that the IS scheme is popular and that contributions and earnings 
are significantly higher under IS when chosen by vote than when assigned exogenously, 
with the difference again being driven at least in part by subject self-selection. While our 
results indicate that allowing counter-punishment does not by itself reduce the efficiency-
promoting potential of IS, it is important to note that there are differences in the way we 
introduce opportunities to counter-punish and the design of Nikiforakis (2008), so that our 
findings must be interpreted with care.
27
 Details are given in Appendix C. 
  
5. Discussion and Conclusion  
 
Unlike the prediction from standard theory, the large majority of subjects in our 
experiment voted to use the formal sanctions mechanism only when it carried a low (here, 
zero) fixed cost. They selected instead the informal sanctions regime when formal 
sanctions were more costly. Votes for the informal sanctions regime were ex post rational 
in that subjects succeeded in reaching high levels of efficiency when informal sanctions 
were available. Informal sanctioning occurred sufficiently often and in a sufficiently well-
targeted manner that in their presence, it became payoff-maximizing to contribute at least 
the observed group median level to the public good, and average contribution rose as low 
contributors risked being targeted with punishment.  Our data confirms many qualitative 
results of Markussen et al. but for environments in which subjects themselves determine 
                                                 
27
 Differences include that (a) Nikiforakis’s subjects have a stage in which counter-punishing is the only 
available activity immediately follows first-order punishing, whereas our subjects can only counter-punish in 
the following or later periods using the same punishment stage as is used for reacting to contributions; (b) 
Nikiforakis’s subjects learn only of punishments aimed at themselves and thus their only higher-order 
punishment option is counter-punishment, whereas our subjects learn of all bi-lateral punishments in their 
group, so what Denant-Boemont et al. (2007) call “punishment enforcement” is also possible; and (c) 
Nikiforakis’s subjects’ identities are scrambled each period, whereas our subjects’ identities remain visible, 
so higher-order punishment can take place over the course of several periods.  Difference (a) may reduce the 
degree of counter-punishment in a “hot state,” as one referee put it, or may reduce “experimenter demand” 
for counter-punishment, as Kamei and Putterman (2012) suggest. With respect to difference (b), our design 
resembles the “full information” treatment in Denant-Boemont et al.  The effects of differing ways of 
making opportunities for higher-order punishment available to subjects are explored by both of the latter 
papers.  Kamei and Putterman find that a treatment closely resembling that of Nikiforakis (2008) is the only 
one of six higher-order punishment treatments that achieves lower efficiency than treatments with first-order 
punishment only.  However, they do not explore treatments that permit long sequences of dedicated counter-
punishment stages, as do studies of “feuding” (e.g., Nikiforakis and Engelmann, 2011). 
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by voting the terms of the formal sanctions used, some subjects experience the available 
institutions before voting, formal sanctions carry both variable and fixed costs, and the 
formal sanction options are more neutral because perverse formal sanctions are always an 
option.  The congruence of results is also remarkable since our subject pool is drawn from 
a diverse student body in a different country. 
 We found evidence that subjects’ varying orientations towards cooperation, and in 
some cases their differing intelligence levels, mattered for their votes. More intelligent 
subjects were significantly more likely to vote for whichever of FS or IS was associated 
with higher earnings ex post. More conditionally cooperative subjects voted for more 
efficient FS parameters, and subjects inclined to punish perversely under IS were more 
likely to vote for less efficient FS parameters, including penalizing contributions to the 
public rather than private account. The fact that groups’ majorities (and median voters) 
usually selected relatively efficient institutions and FS terms despite subject heterogeneity 
supports a “behavioral public choice theorem” first articulated in Ertan et al. (2009), 
namely that an unsung virtue of majority rule is that in social dilemmas, strongly anti-
social or uncooperative inclinations are rarely shared by groups’ majorities, so voting 
helps to neutralize them.
28
   
Our demonstration that individuals achieve high levels of cooperation at low cost 
using informal sanctions, even when formal sanctions of modest cost are available, can be 
argued to be one of the strongest pieces of evidence for the presence and impact of the 
willingness to incur a private cost to punish in a large and growing experimental literature 
on the topic. Our results occurred despite the fact that we advantaged FS by modeling 
them as being imposed with certainty when triggered by the actions specified, whereas 
most real-world sanction schemes are fallible, both with respect to catching and imposing 
penalties on violators, and also the possibility of mistakenly punishing non-violators.  
On the other hand, our design also advantaged IS by assuming that subjects always 
had cost-free and accurate information on which to condition their punishing. More 
realistically, accurate targeting of informal sanctions might depend on costly monitoring 
                                                 
28
 To be sure, uncooperative majorities may be found in some settings, as the results of Herrmann et al. 
(2008) suggest.  How voting outcomes differ across societies is an interesting topic for future research.   
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choices by individuals, and lowered efficiency of IS due to imperfect observations (see 
Ambrus and Greiner, 2012) might tip preferences back towards formal sanctions. Future 
experiments could study subjects’ willingness to pay to improve monitoring and reduce 
errors, as well as the effect of uncertainty of penalization and errors on choice of scheme. 
Another potentially complicating issue is that it may be more difficult in practice to 
prevent individuals from engaging in informal sanctioning activities than our design 
assumes, so the relevant choice might be formal sanctions accompanied by whatever 
informal sanctions individuals also decide to engage in (see Kube and Traxler, 2011 as 
well as related robustness treatments in Markussen et al.). Finally, the relative 
effectiveness of informal and formal sanctions in groups of larger scale might differ from 
what we observe in five-person groups, helping to explain the preference for formal 
sanctions at societal levels.  
Ultimately, we think it useful to view our results from a perspective that sees 
voluntary or informal cooperation not simply as an alternative but also as a complement to 
formal authority and sanctions. Whereas availability of a formal sanctioning capacity that 
is responsive to majority will is automatic in our experiment, creating and sustaining such 
a capacity may in the real world require voluntary participation, monitoring, and other 
forms of engagement by citizens. Experimental evidence of voluntary collective action, 
including willingness to punish non-cooperators, might thus be seen not as indicating that 
the state is unnecessary, but as reassuring us that the cooperative underpinnings of the state 
are not out of reach. We hope to explore the interconnections between informal and 
authority-backed cooperation in future research. 
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Table 1: Summary of treatments, sessions, and group and subject numbers 
 
 
Notes: NS = no sanctions, FS = formal sanctions, IS = informal sanctions. The experiment as a 
whole consisted of 20 sessions in which 75 groups composed of 375 individual subjects 
participated. There were a total of 188 group votes on the use of FS versus IS, with 958 individual 
votes on that question. The Exogenous IS comparison treatment (dashed rectangle) appears in the 
cell of Treatment 6-C because its parameters and structure are identical to that of groups selecting 
IS in 6-C treatment except for the fact that the IS scheme is imposed rather than chosen by vote. 
For time structures of 3-Vote, 6-Vote and Baseline treatments, see Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Experimental Design  
 
(A) 3-Vote treatments 
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(B) 6-Vote treatments 
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(C) BASELINE treatment 
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Note: The additional rounds 1.5 in 3-Vote and Baseline treatments and 0.5 in 6-Vote treatment, are the periods 
in which the conditional contribution schedules described in footnotes are drawn upon for one randomly 
selected group member to determine all group members’ payoffs. 
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Figure 2: Share of voting outcomes for formal vs. informal sanctions, and for sanction rates, by phase 
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(a) Share of formal vs. informal scheme vote outcomes, by phase 
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(b) Shares of voting outcomes for penalty rates, by phase 
 
Note: data are group outcomes, not individual votes.
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Figure 3: The trends of average contribution to the public account and average amount of informal sanctions given 
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Figure 4: Contributions under formal scheme by sanction rate 
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Figure 5: Average earnings under NS, IS, and FS in early and late phases 
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